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Abstract: The object of this work is to evaluate the monetary policy issues that 
arose during the financial crisis of 2007–8 according to minsky’s thought. It is 
argued that minsky’s idea of structural instability may fit the policy problems 
linked to the crisis. In particular, minsky’s contribution to the theory of central 
banking is used to evaluate the conduct of the Federal reserve during the crisis. 
minsky’s reading of the roles of the central bank in the presence of sophisticated 
markets and securitization is helpful in understanding both the failure of the 
Federal reserve in preventing the crisis and the relative success in mitigating the 
effects. This apparent success notwithstanding, the paper warns that economic 
policy, to promote stability, must enlarge the stability field of the system by 
changing the type of institutions operating there and their business habits.
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The objective of this article is to evaluate the monetary policy issues that arose 
during the financial crisis of 2007–8 according to Minsky’s thought. 
Minsky and the Current Crisis
The Debate on Minsky’s Financial Fragility Hypothesis and the 
Current Financial Crisis
The scholarly literature on Minsky and the financial crisis has until now concentrated 
on whether Minsky’s theory of financial instability may be used to explain the cur-
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rent crisis (see Bellofiore and Halevi 2009; Davidson 2008; Kregel 2008). Bellofiore 
and Halevi (2009) argue that this is possible, though with several adjustments. The 
original financial instability hypothesis was developed in the historical climate of 
a growing economy with inflation problems. Minsky’s thesis that the instability of 
a capitalist economy is endogenous has been formalized in models in which the 
main variable that mattered for business cycle fluctuations was investment (see 
Bellofiore and Ferri 2001). In the current evolution of capitalism, Bellofiore and 
Halevi (2009) warn that some aspects of the original story told by Minsky may not 
be retained. One aspect is the growing indebtedness of the corporate sector as the 
boom phase of the business cycle develops, which would not be realistic anymore. 
The corporate sector, rather receiving funds from the other sectors, is lending funds 
to them. The second aspect is the centrality of investment in the generation of the 
different phases of the cycle. Currently, monetary policy has managed to make 
debt-financed consumption the main item in aggregate demand. Further, global-
ized capitalism has managed to avoid inflationary pressures through relocation and 
compression of wages.
Kregel (2008) writes that Minsky’s ideas of margin of safety, debt deflation, and 
financial fragility are all important for understanding the current crisis. He thinks, 
however, that Ponzi financing and declining margins of safety are not the results of 
an endogenous process as usually explained. The crisis stems from the way credit-
worthiness is evaluated in the new originate and distribute model. The endogenous 
financial fragility hypothesis turns on the point that the expansion itself validates 
riskier projects. It is not that bankers are becoming increasingly less risk averse 
than they were before the expansion, it is simply that the results from past history 
are better and, given these good performances, they are inclined to extend credits 
to the people who have performed well. In turn, the expansion enables people to 
repay their past loans and thus validates the bankers’ choices (see Kregel 2008: 
10). However, the main features of the current crisis are not overinvestment, excess 
borrowing, and concentration of risk. The current crisis shows indeed declining 
margins of safety and Ponzi financing, but these events are not generated by the 
process described above. 
According to Kregel, the declining margin of safety and the Ponzi financing 
depend on the structural change that occurred in the financial system in the United 
States. The type of institutions present and their conduct has led to a sort of built-
in structural underestimation of risk and Ponzi attitude to financing. In a certain 
sense, the number of Ponzi units was not random or increasing with prosperity 
(pro-cyclical) but depended strictly on the operating rules of American nonbank 
financial institutions. What Kregel means is that there was an endogenous shift 
neither from sound to bad financing nor from speculative to Ponzi units. Simply, 
the change in regulation and the environmental constraints (read securitization) 
made most financial units arise as Ponzi units. Those financial units were profit-
able only by operating under Ponzi-type behavior; they were created with the aim 
of being like this.
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Kregel writes that the changes to the Glass-Steagall Act jointly with the Basel 
Accord have changed the way banks operate. They aim mainly at earning income 
from fee and underwriting operations and, for various reasons also linked to regula-
tion, shift lending operations to off-balance sheet entities. Thus, they do not have 
any more loans on their balance sheets, and they are no longer concerned with the 
risk of the borrowers. The shifting out of loans to other entities and the originate 
and distribute model have changed the evaluation of credit risk, which is no longer 
performed by banks but by rating agencies (see Kregel 2008: 12).
The banks no longer lend directly; they sell their securitized loans to the interme-
diaries, which in turn issue their own paper to buy it. Those intermediaries depend 
on the interest rate margins to earn their profits and are subject to liquidity, interest 
rate, and other risks. They were relying on spread income as a source of revenue. 
As the Fed tightened and the term structure changed shape, with short-term rates 
higher than long-term ones, spreads became negative. The only cushion of safety 
foreseen was the overcollateralization of the commercial paper relative to riskier 
investment notes. This was insufficient to face the risks involved in this activity 
(see Kregel 2008: 18).
The increase in fragility was not due to the declining margin of safety. It just 
showed how inaccurate the estimates and the classification of risks by rating 
agencies had been. These estimates were based only on the correlations between 
the credit characteristics of previous borrowers in relation to changes in financial 
conditions. Since the beginning, therefore, these practices narrowed the margin of 
safety. During the crisis this insufficient margin of safety, which had been insuf-
ficient right from the start, became evident (see Kregel 2008: 12). Kregel concludes 
that the crisis was due not to a declining margin of safety but to the revelation that 
this margin of safety had always been terribly low.
I wish to argue that there is a more general way to reconcile Minsky’s theory of 
financial instability with the current crisis. The starting point of Minsky’s theory 
was the rejection of the neoclassical synthesis. He denied that Keynes’s instability 
hypothesis could be reduced to introducing liquidity preference in the equation for 
money demand. The instability Keynes hinted at was more pervasive than that, and 
it was linked to the notion of radical uncertainty. Uncertainty mattered, insofar as 
the capitalist economy was a sophisticated financial economy. In a period in which 
investment was the main engine of aggregate demand, this meant recognizing that 
investment was a flow and had a price deeply influenced by expectations of future 
financial variables in contrast to the price of the capital stock. Sudden shifts in ex-
pectations might produce fluctuations in the demand price of investment and then 
produce a deep recession if the central bank and the government do not intervene 
to sustain aggregate demand and profits.
An interpretation of Minsky’s financial fragility theory, which hinges on struc-
tural instability rather than on dynamic macroeconomic instability, may be found in 
Vercelli (1999). Vercelli (1999) draws a distinction between dynamic instability and 
structural instability. Dynamic instability means that a system, after a disturbance, 
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which will bring it beyond its equilibrium position, will tend either to go back to 
the initial position again or to reach another equilibrium configuration. Structural 
instability, instead, would mean that a small disturbance, even a very small one 
(infinitesimal), may change the qualitative characteristics of its dynamic behavior 
(see Vercelli 1999: 4). This means that a shock may have different effects according 
to the way it changes the parameters of the system. These parameters may be the 
distribution of hedge, Ponzi, and speculative units in the system but also the propa-
gation velocity (see Vercelli 1999) and the potential damage, I would add, due to 
repeated rounds of falling securities’ prices, a sort of multiplier of an initial loss.
Vercelli (1999) traces Minsky’s notion of instability to his interpretation of 
Keynes. To interpret Keynes by using the notion of structural instability means to 
stress that the main behavioral relations defined in the general theory, such as the 
propensity to consume and the marginal efficiency of capital, may be subject to 
sudden and unforeseeable shifts. He defines in the following his interpretation of 
Minsky’s theory:
The cycle is seen in its essence as the regular repetition of structural states 
characterized by a different degree of financial fragility which has to be inter-
preted in terms of structural instability. Both endogenous and exogenous factors 
play a crucial role and interact in a complex way. The endogenous factors are 
not grounded in disequilibrium dynamics (convergent or divergent) as in the 
macrodynamic approach but in the intrinsic structural instability of a monetary 
economy and its evolution. On the other hand this approach gives also a differ-
ent, enhanced, role to exogenous shocks which may trigger sizeable qualitative 
changes in the economic behaviour of the system and are not subject to proba-
bilistic restrictions in their properties such as stationarity or symmetry. (Vercelli 
2001: 11; emphasis added)
From this point of view, we do not necessarily need a macroeconomic theory of 
the trade cycle based on investment to use the financial fragility hypothesis. The 
evolution of legislation and business strategies in the past twenty years has pro-
vided a whole range of exogenous shocks to transform the way financial fragility 
shows itself. Within this framework it may be entirely right that declining margins 
of safety are not the result of an endogenous process. Vercelli (1999) adds that the 
exogenous shocks in the case of a single unit may be interpreted as a change in 
the rate of interest and that the endogenous cycle may be related to the financial 
position of units in the taxonomy of hedge, speculative, and Ponzi types of financ-
ing. This, however, is just an example. The exogenous shock may be another one 
among many, and the definitions of units may change as well.
The distribution of units among the three categories and the reciprocal relations 
among them determine the degree to which a financial system is fragile. If the struc-
tural interpretation of fragility is chosen, then the endogenous story can be reshaped 
as follows. The structural instability of the system had greatly increased before the 
crisis, due to the high number of Ponzi units present from the beginning. Not only 
has the crisis caused a transformation of balance sheets characteristics, that is, from 
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hedge and speculative into Ponzi, but it has, through the breakdown of organized 
exchanges, made the same Ponzi units unable to go on with their businesses. In a 
way, this is an endogenous change too. It has only to be added to the picture that, 
under certain institutional conditions, Ponzi units may survive without going into 
bankruptcy for a longer time than that which is usually assumed.
Minsky on the Structure of Financial Markets and Structural Instability
Minsky tries to envisage a relation, which is not linear, between the instability of 
the units and the instability of the system. In the current crisis, both the presence 
of a high number of Ponzi units in the financial system (see Kregel 2008) and the 
complexity of economic structure would indicate that potential losses might be 
very big. He writes that the stability range of a financial system is an endogenous 
phenomenon that depends on financial structure and institutional arrangements. 
The exogenous elements are instead the public sector and central bank regulation. 
The stability range tells us the maximum amount of a shock a financial system 
may absorb without deviating from the initial equilibrium position. Of course, the 
smaller the stability range is, the smaller the shock that leads to a deviation of the 
financial system from its initial position may be. When the stability area is tiny, 
even a small shock can cause a permanent deviation from equilibrium.
There are two essential determinants of the stability field: the degree to which a 
narrow relation exists between regular inflows from income and outflows and the 
weight in portfolios of assets that can be sold at their historical accounting values. 
The narrower the relation between income inflows and payments outflows and 
the greater the weight of assets that must be sold at market values, the smaller the 
stability field of the system. A third but less important determinant of stability is 
the degree to which the prices of assets incorporate optimistic expectations made 
in a period of euphoria (see Minsky 1982).
The stability field of the financial system in the United States before the crisis 
was indeed very thin. The ratio of assets, whose value depends on the behavior 
of the system to external assets, was indeed very high; for the safe assets, such as 
public debt and the assets whose price could be stabilized by central bank action, 
were only a small fraction of total assets. Moreover, the weight in portfolio of assets, 
which could be sold at their historical accounting values, was very low because of 
the widespread practice of “mark to market” accounting.
The link between inflows and outflows was indeed very tight because the units 
were operating with no capital and reserves at all, so that all the payment obligations 
could be met only if an inflow of the same amount was received at the same time. The 
units were very highly leveraged. Often the maturities of assets and liabilities held 
in portfolio were different, so that even the contractual obligations on the liabilities 
did not match the time pattern of income received on assets. Liabilities were short 
term, whereas assets were long term. All these elements—the high number of Ponzi 
units within the financial system, the increase in layering, and the limited ability 
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of the central bank to stabilize the system through monetary policy and to act as a 
lender of last resort to the whole financial system—made the so-called stability range 
terribly small. Minsky talks about transformations in portfolios as a way to react to 
the money supply restriction, which happens at the end of a long boom period. In 
this case, the tendency toward financial innovation does not seem to arise from the 
necessary tightening of monetary policy after a long expansion but just for the aim 
of getting a higher profit rate by increasing leverage and layering.
The first signs of the crisis, in the summer of 2007, perfectly mirror Minsky’s 
observations on the importance of structural stability. Dodd (2007) asks himself 
how a modest increase in delinquent subprime mortgages, which added about 
$34 billion in troubled loans, might disrupt the $57 trillion U.S. financial system. 
Although lax if not fraudulent lending policies are responsible for the increase 
in nonperforming loans, the impact on the financial system is much greater than 
expected (see Dodd 2007: 15). The answer he gives to the question is that the 
mortgage crisis is as much about the breakdown of the structure of U.S. financial 
markets as it is about bad debt.
This means that the potential losses resulting from a shock to the system depend 
on the relation among the units. If the number of links (of bilateral and multilateral 
relations) among the units is high, then the loan recalling and asset sales will be 
considerable. Dodd (2007) shows us with a graph what happened during the first 
months of the financial crisis in the United States. This graph is a sort of map of 
the mutual relations within the financial system. The system, indeed, broke down 
because of the interaction between different segments of financial markets and of 
reciprocal debts among financial institutions. The first institutions to face trouble 
were the hedge funds.
When the crisis started, markets became illiquid at the same moment that hedge 
funds had to sell assets to repay losses. As a result, hedge funds stopped trading 
and the collateralized debt markets and other derivates markets ceased to exist. The 
issuers of these instruments ceased to issue them. With no market, the originators 
could not sell the loans they had made anymore. The problem then passed from 
the market for collateralized debt to the market for commercial paper. Because 
this paper was asset backed and the assets, which were behind this paper, were 
the collateralized debts, buyers was immediately aware that this paper was worth 
nothing or very little, so they stopped buying it.
Financial markets were multilayered because of the new financial instruments 
such as derivatives, particularly credit derivatives, and the financial institutions, 
which traded in them, were highly leveraged. Under these conditions, even a small 
shock might destroy the whole building. Minsky writes,
Financial institutions usually take a position in financial assets by issuing their 
own liabilities. The contracts they own or issue include the promise to pay cash 
on demand at a predetermined rate. These institutions may get additional income 
sources by buying and selling contracts in markets. Then the uncertainty they face 
is not only related to the expected shortfalls and excesses of their cash flows but 
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also to the state of the various money markets when they need to make positions 
by operating in them. (1982: 185)
This excerpt is particularly important in the interpretation of the current crisis. 
According to the financial fragility interpretation, as a business cycle theory this 
would not be important. The usual story of how a financial crisis starts would be the 
following. A rise in interest rates would lower, through present value calculations, 
all the expected future incomes and would make the current interest expenditures 
rise, thereby causing a revision of expected sales and profits and a reduction in 
planned investment. This, in turn, through the aggregate demand repercussions, 
would cause a recession.
In the current crisis, the most important aspect is the second one stressed in the 
quote above, namely, the state of markets when operators need to make positions 
in them. Many financial institutions and many nonfinancial ones were unable to 
continue their normal operations not because of downward revision of expectation 
but because of the sudden disappearance of markets. Liquidity in markets is the 
channel through which the qualitative consequences of a shock to the system emerge. 
If liquidity is abundant and it is very easy to resell assets after having bought them, 
then even Ponzi units may continue their businesses for a long time.
As long as the state of the markets is such as to ensure profitable reselling and 
leveraging, the process may go on. If a very small change occurs, the whole process 
will proceed in the opposite direction because all units will try to deleverage by 
selling assets. The liquidity of the markets for the new financial instruments was 
not ensured in any way, and the institutional environment did not care about it at 
all. All this became evident during the financial crisis. As Kregel writes, there is no 
endogenous mechanism through which previously hedge or speculative positions 
turned out to become speculative or Ponzi-like. Ponzi units were as such right from 
the beginning, and they could continue to carry out their businesses just because 
they succeeded in getting greater and greater debts on the market. Those debts 
were contracted in the form of securities. These units were issuing their own debt, 
so, as long as the market agreed to buy it, they could go on and enjoy profits. As 
the markets ceased to work, this game was no longer feasible. An extreme case 
of structural instability arises when, after a shock, not only do some units go into 
bankruptcy but the markets themselves disappear as well.
In this way, a shock may cause not only a temporary deviation from a dynamic 
equilibrium (i.e., a reassessment of balance sheet positions until the expected future 
inflows rise again and the economy recovers) but also a qualitative change. In this 
particular case, the qualitative change happened because of the disruption of the 
markets for certain financial instruments and the impossibility of carrying out ex-
changes. At this point, the role of the central bank in the working of money markets 
needs to be introduced. Under these conditions the role of the central bank and of 
the government was not only to provide liquidity and to support profits to avoid 
a downward revision of expected future incomes and a fall in planned investment 
but also and more importantly to reconstruct markets.
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Minsky on Central Banking
Let us recall some of Minsky’s important insights on the role of central banks in 
financial markets, which, although written a long time ago, are appropriate for 
describing the roles of central banks in a world of sophisticated financial markets 
with a layered structure.
According to Minsky, the role of the central bank is not only to intervene in dif-
ficult situations but also to help markets work under normal conditions every day. 
He writes that the central bank has to maintain orderly conditions in all markets 
for financial markets to be efficient. To maintain orderly conditions in financial 
markets means to protect those who hold positions in these markets. In particular, 
secondary markets must be developed to generate liquidity when the system is 
working smoothly and to ensure protection when the system is working badly. 
Minsky stresses that the dealers who operate in those markets must have access 
to central bank refinancing because the only universally accepted guarantee is 
that of the central bank. Further, he argues that if the central bank could stabilize 
certain private assets, these assets would become sources of liquidity at certain 
warranted prices.
Minsky (1982) observed that only a small part of the reserve base of banks comes 
from discount operations at the central banks. Discount at the central bank may 
perform three roles: a temporary cushion against pressures on the money market, 
a regular source of reserves, and a means to stabilize prices during a crisis. For the 
central bank to act as a lender of last resort during a crisis, the bank must normally 
deal with a great part of markets where securities are traded. One way to make this 
happen is to encourage the creation of secondary markets for activities and organize 
them in such a way that the central bank regularly finances its dealers. The central 
bank action as a lender of last resort must be such as to avoid the fall in the value 
of assets, which leads to a recession.
Minsky looks at the central bank not just as the entity obliged to give emergency 
loans during a crisis but also as an important institution that ensures normal op-
erations in markets. However, he is worried that the process of securitization may 
make it difficult for the central bank to act in this way. Minsky (2008) warned that 
securitization might make the central bank unable to control the supply of money. 
In fact, the financial institutions, which work in the securitization process, do not 
hold any reserves and capital. Minsky also stresses the danger that they pose to 
financial stability: “Securitization lowers the weight of that part of the financing 
structure that the central bank (the Federal Reserve in the United States) is com-
mitted to protect” (2008: 3).
Minsky writes that in a securitized world, rating securities’ revision of the risk 
class of securities may cause a rush to sell the underlying assets, which in turn will 
start the debt deflation process. This is, actually, what happened in the first months 
of the crisis at the end of 2007 (see Dodd 2007). He warns also that the market for 
securitized assets will be a thin market if the price and quality of securities deterio-
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rate (see Minsky 2008). These ideas fit the events under discussion perfectly.
In particular, Minsky stresses the point that the central bank must become a 
lender of last resort to the money market not only to the distressed credit institu-
tions (1982: 241). He recalls that the classic operating rule of the central bank of 
England was to act as the lender of last resort to financial institutions such as the 
discount houses, which controlled a large part of the money market. He observes 
too that the effectiveness of the central bank policy depends on the way its actions 
affect the structure of the money market. The effectiveness of a certain monetary 
policy depends on the institutions present in the market and on their operating habits. 
Only if the environment is static can the effects of monetary policy be reasonably 
foreseen. In a context of rapid evolution of markets, the same does not hold.
The action of the central bank may have different effects in different institutional 
contexts. Financial markets change from either their evolution or legislation. Min-
sky considers, in particular, an example that may shed light on the conditions of 
the current crisis as well. He writes about the financing of institutions, which are 
dealers in the market for public securities and discusses the repurchase agreements 
that they use to finance themselves. The dealers, who traded in the public securities 
market at that time, held in their books repurchase agreements with nonfinancial 
corporations who employed their liquid funds in this way. Minsky describes the 
implications of this change in financing. If nonfinancial corporations withdrew their 
funds, the dealers would be compelled to ask banks for credit.
Given the term structure of interest rates prevailing at the time, this could be 
very costly. Minsky thinks that they would not have been able to take positions in a 
market that was shrinking. If the Federal Reserve did not intervene to finance them, 
interest rates would rise very rapidly. This induces Minsky to conclude that a money 
market that depends on short-term credit by nonfinancial corporations requires an 
institutional setting that allows reserves to be unloaded in the market whenever 
liquidity problems arise. The situation of the short-term money market during the 
current crisis was far worse than that described by Minsky in the example. Many 
financial institutions operating in various segments of the system had no reserves 
at all, having no legal obligation to hold them, and regularly sold assets to raise 
money. Unfortunately, the liquidity of those assets was not warranted at all.
On the assets side of most institutions, including those trading in commercial 
paper, there were collateralized debt obligations issued by special purpose vehicles. 
The regular selling of those assets ensured liquidity in case of necessity. As the first 
sign of problems in the mortgage market appeared, the market for collateralized 
debt obligations ceased to exist. Those who had these instruments in their portfolio 
could no longer sell them to raise money and, in turn, fulfill their own obligations. 
Thus, the crisis spread to all segments of the market.
Most financing of the institutions operating in the market for loans and mortgages 
was made through reciprocal lending within the financial system itself. Repurchase 
agreements were the tool generally used to get new financing. In a repurchase agree-
ment, the borrower sells an asset today at a price that is below the market price and 
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agrees to repurchase it at a certain date at a price fixed in advance. The difference 
between the current market price and the repurchase price of the security is called the 
haircut. Adrian and Shin (2008b) show that most of the financing by nonbank financial 
intermediaries, namely dealers and brokers, happened using this instrument.
The variable that mattered for the cost of financing was not the interest rate but 
the haircut. The haircut largely determines the quantity of funds that intermediar-
ies can raise. In distressed times, the haircut rises sharply, and the possibility of 
borrowing based on existing assets in their portfolio is thus limited. This, in turn, 
hinders the dealers and brokers in performing their main role: to make markets for 
securitized products, whose availability determines the credit supply for consum-
ers and nonfinancial firms. Brokers and dealers fund themselves with short-term 
debt in the form of repurchase agreements and, in part, pass this debt back to 
hedge funds through reverse sale and repurchase agreements. They invest instead 
in longer-term, less liquid securities.
The variable that matters most for these transactions is the price of securities 
exchanged. The current price is crucial, because it determines the extent of the 
loans that can be obtained and the future repurchase price. Under these conditions, 
the central bank, if it wants to prevent a financial crisis, may avoid any fall in the 
price of securities for whatever reason. Today, through the liquidity injections and 
its special interventions, the central bank has succeeded in restoring the price of 
assets. Stock values have risen again by 50 percent at the time of writing. This 
helps in restoring the high leverage by financial institutions and their speculative 
practices while at the same time allowing them to pursue the same management 
policies that led to the current crisis.
Central Bank Interventions During the Current Crisis in the 
United States
In the first stage of the crisis, the Federal Reserve tried to solve the liquidity problem 
by lowering the interest rate. This was repeated many times, without any improve-
ment in market conditions. The spread between the interbank market interest rate 
and the so-called overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate at the same maturity widened 
instead of narrowing.
The failure of monetary policy to deal with the crisis was not a surprise, as the 
problem of carrying out monetary policy in a securitized system with a large part 
consisting of nonbank financial institutions has been mentioned. The central bank 
had lost the power to control the financial system for quite some time, according 
to some scholars (see D’Arista 2009; Kregel 2008). The intervention of central 
banks offering reserves may work in an institutional environment where banks 
are the main financial institutions. According to the endogenous money supply 
hypothesis, the money supply process goes the other way around with respect to 
textbook presentations of the money multiplier.
Deposits do not create credits, rather, credits create deposits. However, given the 
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institutional change in the system, it is difficult to see any link between deposits 
and credits at the banking system now because of the enormous space gained by 
nonbank financial institutions. Erturk  and Ozgur (2008) find that empirical relation 
is indeed very weak. Banks have become independent from required reserves and 
core deposits and have even avoided the constraints posed by capital requirement 
through securitization.
In the period before the crisis, the extension of credit did not follow an increased 
trade volume, but it was perhaps driven by asset price expectations (see Erturk and 
Ozgur 2008). This thesis seems to find support in other studies on the composi-
tion of the balance sheets of financial institutions, particularly investment banks. 
Adrian and Shin (2008a, 2008b) find that the lowering of the federal funds rate is 
positively correlated with an increase in the rate of growth of assets in the balance 
sheets of investment banks. The only effect of a lax monetary policy, according to 
Adrian and Fleming (2005) and Adrian and Shin (2008a, 2008b), was to artificially 
inflate the sizes of the balance sheet of investment banks.
Every time monetary policy was relaxed, they borrowed more funds on the 
markets and then used the proceeds to buy financial assets. In this way, both sides 
of their balance sheets showed higher and higher values. The process was profitable 
because the cost of debt was very low and the prices of financial assets were rising. 
Thus, the easing of monetary policy did not bring about an increase in credit supply 
in the conventional sense; it increased only the assets of financial institutions, which 
do not enter into money aggregates. The transmission channel did not depend on 
the interest rate but on the haircut (see Adrian and Shin 2008a).
During a crisis, liquidity injections do not reach all parts of the financial system. 
In a securitized system, as Minsky stated, the central bank is committed to protect 
only a part of the system. Under normal conditions, easing conditions for that part 
of the system may lead to the expansion of the assets of the whole system. If banks 
get more credit from the central bank they may, through various arrangements, give 
more credit to other parts of the financial system. During a crisis, this mechanism 
does not work. Even if banks receive more credit, they will end up redepositing 
reserves at the central bank, particularly if they are remunerated. The flow of credit 
from the banks to the nonbanks, or from commercial banks to other financial insti-
tutions, stops under periods of stress (see Goodhart 1993). Goodhart (1993) warns 
against the problems posed by a dichotomized financial system.
Some research on the financial crisis has dealt with the problem of complexity. 
The complexity of the financial system would have made interventions by the 
central bank difficult. The answer would be to change institutional arrangements, 
particularly those on netting. Brunnermeier (2009) suggests that network and 
counterparty problems of credit risk played a role in the freezing of the inter-
bank market. He argues that these problems may be more easily overcome if a 
clearinghouse or another central authority or regulator is introduced that knows 
who owes what to whom. He suggests that multilateral netting agreements, such 
as the service provided by SwapClear, can stabilize the system.
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The introduction of structured products, which are typically traded over the 
counter, would have made the web of obligations in the financial system opaque 
and would have increased systemic risk. Brunnermeier (2009) provides an example 
in which the netting of positions between two investment banks would have been 
possible if there were no counterparty risk involved and if no other financial institu-
tions were involved. If the settlement of positions among banks requires an estimate 
of other parties’ reliability, it becomes extremely difficult and very costly.
The central bank cannot replace the lost trust among institutions—which is 
owing to the incapacity to value securities in their balance sheets—that are not 
treated in markets that are regulated and whose liquidity is warranted. Obviously, 
the role of the central bank in the interbank market is always to replace its own 
money to the claims of banks to each other. The claims of a bank on another and 
the debt of the latter owed to the former are always settled by using central bank 
money, by definition (see Rochon and Rossi 2007). Given the widespread use of 
derivative instruments, it was difficult to assess the structure of debt and claims 
among financial institutions and thus the amounts to be netted.
Although the main fault of the central bank is to have let short-term money 
markets grow without any control, just the opposite of what Minsky recommended, 
it is illusory to identify the main problem that has led to the crisis as a problem of 
netting arrangements. Just changing netting arrangements is not a sufficient tool to 
restore the health of the financial system; rather other measures that tend to avoid 
Ponzi behaviors are needed. A clearinghouse arrangement would have helped to 
overcome liquidity problems if the central bank had realized it in due time, but the 
main problem once the crisis set in was solvency, not just liquidity.
Most agents in the financial system knew that the problem facing financial 
institutions was not liquidity but solvency. The widespread belief that most finan-
cial institutions were virtually insolvent, confirmed by some failures, hindered the 
exchange. This is why the central bank and the government had to change policy 
and give direct support to the markets through asset purchases and offers of public 
guarantee to private transactions. In this situation, the central bank completely 
changed its role. Instead of simply netting out transactions among banks and act-
ing as the lender of last resort to the banking system, it has become, as Buiter and 
Sibert (2007) pointed out, a market maker of last resort.
Some markets, which were drying up because there were no intermediaries 
willing to make deals, as in the commercial paper market, have been revitalized 
by the central bank, entering the market directly and purchasing the paper. Even-
tually, its intervention did convince intermediaries to restart their activities again. 
In the commercial paper market, however, the granting of a state guarantee by the 
Treasury has also played a role (see BIS 2009; Brunnermeier 2009). The bank had 
to intervene to buy the bad assets directly and replace them with safe assets, such 
as state debt. The Treasury had to give its warranty to many products in various 
markets to make them function again. The result of all these interventions has been 
an enormous increase in the balance sheets of both the Treasury and the Federal 
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Reserve. However, given the slow rate of growth of the economy, this increase does 
not fuel inflation and does provide the private sector with some good assets to hold 
in their portfolio (see Papadimitriou and Hannsgen 2009).
We have seen that conventional monetary policy has not succeeded in improv-
ing conditions in money markets and that other less conventional measures the 
central bank has introduced have performed better. These measures are different 
from monetary policy in that they change the asset composition of the assets side 
of the central bank balance sheet and do not involve lending reserves. In this way, 
they should not interfere with monetary policy (see Bernanke 2009; Fleming et al. 
2009; Keister et al. 2008). Bernanke (2009), Fleming et al. (2009), and Keister et 
al. (2008) argue that the increase in central bank assets and liabilities will not lead 
to an increase in the supply of money.
In particular, the term securities lending facility has been successful. The Fed, 
after this initial experiment, has planned to and indeed has implemented other 
facilities aimed at supporting other markets, such as the asset-backed commercial 
paper market through the Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility and the 
Money Market Investor Funding Facility. The Fed, in addition, plans to purchase 
long-term securities for its portfolio debt of government-sponsored enterprises. 
Bernanke (2009) argues that the central bank has switched from conventional 
monetary policy to these other measures because the federal funds rate has virtu-
ally approached its lower bound, which is zero. This has been the result because 
when many financial institutions were deemed insolvent, the state or the central 
bank intervened to guarantee for them. This happened either through direct asset 
purchase or through taking control of these institutions. This is not monetary policy. 
The result of all these interventions has been an enormous increase in the balance 
sheets of the Federal Reserve, although this has arisen jointly with the other policy 
measures taken by the government, whose financial burden weighs on the Trea-
sury to restore the profits of financial institutions. The prospects for the future are 
a continued money and credit supply expansion to keep these profits high and to 
make the stock exchange go up again. This action has in part succeeded because 
there are signs of improvement in the market for bonds and shares.
The restoration of stock exchange values, of course, offers many advantages 
for the balance sheets of financial institutions and for the pensions of American 
citizens. The enormous efforts in this direction, however, have not yet been accom-
panied by a reform of the structure of the financial system. To again use Minsky’s 
words, the monetary policy has avoided a terrible destruction and a fall in output 
growth even bigger than that experienced hitherto, but it has achieved this goal by 
supporting the profits, in this case, not of inefficient firms in the real sector but of 
firms engaging in Ponzi financing in the financial sector. Thus, the conditions for 
the next crisis are set unless measures are taken to avoid these financing practices 
in the future (see Tymoigne 2009).
Under the current conditions of capitalism, where profits of the financial sector 
are a high percentage of total profits, this is a new way to propose the old dilemma: 
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either not to intervene and experience a painful recession or intervene to support 
business profits even if their plans were not successful.
Do These Policies Warrant Financial Stability in the Long Run?
I have argued that Minsky’s theory of financial fragility, interpreted as a theory of 
structural instability, is useful for interpreting the current crisis. Structural instability 
means that a small event can change the qualitative characteristic of a system and 
thus even its dynamic properties. As Minsky wrote, beyond the uncertainty arising 
from expected inflows and outflows, what matters is the state of markets when people 
need to take positions in them. Before the financial crisis, although many agents 
were speculative and Ponzi ones, the extreme liquidity of the markets has allowed 
them to operate quietly for a long time. When the crisis exploded, a tiny increase 
in the bankruptcy rate of mortgages caused the breakdown of the whole financial 
system. The qualitative change that followed in this case was the destruction of 
markets. The central bank then had to react with a very special set of measures 
tending to restore the normal operations of markets by ad hoc interventions in many 
different sectors. Just pumping liquidity into the system was insufficient.
The Federal Reserve, under the pressure of events unfolding to hinder the 
working of the short-term money markets, has done exactly what Hyman Minsky 
recommended a long time ago, in the 1960s. It has extended the realm of finan-
cial institutions eligible to obtain credit and the range of securities accepted as 
collateral. In this way it has in part achieved the result of stabilizing the price of 
those securities, which are mostly traded and which are in the portfolios of the 
market makers. However, all this has happened too late, after the crisis spread to 
the real sector. The crisis started in August 2007. The assets of the central bank 
have increased significantly only during the second half of 2008 up to the time of 
writing in 2009.
Given that the structure of financial markets has collapsed, the interventions were 
not directed merely to provide liquidity and support nonfinancial business profits. 
We read in Minsky (1982) that the support of profits by government expenditure is 
crucial for avoiding the downward revision of future income expectations and so of 
planned investment. The intervention of the state to support profits by increasing 
expenditure is as important as the provision of liquidity. In the last financial crisis, 
the first and main role of the state has been that of reconstructing markets. This is 
what distinguishes current interventions from those made in other occasions.
This is also what justifies the reading of Minsky’s theory according to the 
structural instability hypothesis. For the system to restart, the first step has been 
that of restoring the normal working of markets. However, this policy will not trig-
ger a healthy recovery process if the structural conditions that led to the crisis are 
not dealt with. The existence of many Ponzi units, so tightly linked to each other, 
was the result of an environment where striving for high profits was mandatory. 
High profits should be obtained with all available means. In this context, even 
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Ponzi behavior was considered a normal business practice. So, unless the rules 
change to prevent financial and nonfinancial units from behaving as Ponzi units, 
the problem will not be solved. It is not sufficient to inject liquidity and raise ex-
penditure; structural conditions must be changed. Otherwise, the next crisis may 
be just around the corner.
Further, these interventions, in the absence of a serious reform of the financial 
system, will sustain the profits of the financial institutions. The profits of financial 
firms in the United States in 2007 amounted to about 45 percent of total profits, 
as measured in the national accounts. The goal of economic policy should not be 
to restore this situation. A parallel can be drawn with Minsky’s theories about the 
relative stability of the system being warranted by a lax fiscal policy, which sup-
ported nonfinancial firms’ profits and at the same time paved the way to a stagfla-
tionary environment. Mutatis mutandis, in a historical period in which productive 
investment contributed so little to the growth of national product and the process of 
financialization was so widespread, the central bank avoided the crisis until 2007. It 
supported banks’ and financial institutions’ profits by allowing an enormous asset 
price inflation to develop (see De Cecco 1999). Similarly, the measures taken after 
the crisis were aimed at restoring assets prices, which seem to have succeeded in 
reviving markets, including the stock exchange. However, the danger arises that 
all these interventions will merely allow financial institutions to operate in exactly 
the same way as before the crisis (see De Cecco 2009).
The reading of Minsky, according to the structural instability hypothesis, allows 
us also to sketch some policy prescriptions that go beyond the common goals of 
recovery, stated by looking at macroeconomic indicators such as growth of national 
income, employment, and so on. We have seen that the stability range of the finan-
cial system before the crisis was tiny. A very small shock can cause a big crisis. 
This is indeed what happened. Thus, to avoid the same process repeating itself in 
the future, it is necessary to enlarge this stability field. This would mean changing 
regulations in a way that the individual and collective behaviors that led to the 
crisis be hindered or discouraged. Simply strengthening capital requirements and 
supervision for financial institutions is not sufficient. As Tymoigne (2009) writes, 
the criteria for evaluating creditworthiness must be changed to avoid institutions 
from growing and prospering by using Ponzi-type business schemes. He suggests 
that cash flow projections be used to assess creditworthiness. In fact, structural 
instability greatly increased because of the high number of Ponzi agents strictly 
interacting with one another.
Conclusion
We have seen how Minsky’s theory of financial fragility may be applied to the current 
crisis, if it is interpreted in a general sense as a theory of structural instability. This 
means not to rely on specific business cycle models based on investment. In particular, 
the reading by Minsky of the roles of the central bank in the presence of sophisticated 
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markets and securitization is helpful for understanding both the failure of the Federal 
Reserve in preventing the crisis and the relative success in mitigating its effects. This 
apparent success notwithstanding, economic policy, to promote stability, must enlarge 
the stability field of the system by changing the types of institutions operating there and 
their business habits. Although the economy shows signs of macroeconomic recovery, 
the stability of the system in the long run does not seem to have become a goal of cur-
rent policies. The dangers of a tiny stability field are thus still present.
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